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ON THE PROPER MOTIVES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
(OR, WHY YOU DON'T WANT TO INVITE
HOMO ECONOMICUSTO JOIN YOUR BOARD)
By LYNN A. STOUT'
ABSTRACT

One of the most important questions in corporategovernance is how
directors ofpublic corporationscan be motivated to serve the interests of
thefirm. Directorsfrequentlyhold only small stakes in the companies they
manage. Moreover,a variety of legalrules and contractualarrangements
insulate them from liabilityfor business failures. Why then should we
expect them to do a goodjob?
Conventional corporate scholarship has great difficulty wrestling
with this question, in largepartbecause conventionalscholarshipusually
adopts the economist's assumption that directors are rational actors
motivated purely by self-interest. This homo economicus model of
behavior may be fundamentally misleading when applied to corporate
directors. The institution of the corporate board is premised on the
expectation, andthe experience,of directoraltruism, in theform ofa sense
of obligation to the firm and its shareholders. As a result, to properly
understandthe role and conduct of corporatedirectors,we must take into
account the empiricalphenomenon of altruism.
One potential startingpointfor such a project can be found in the
extensive evidence that has been developed over the pastfour decades on
altruism among strangersin experimental games. This evidence demonstrates that altruistic behavior is in fact quite common. More important,
it ispredictable.A variety offactors can reliablyincrease,or decrease, the
incidence ofaltruism observed in experimental games. These results may
offer a foundationfor building a model of human behavior that is both
more accurate and more useful than the homo economicus model. They
alsocarry importantimplicationsfor how we select, educate,regulate,and
compensate corporate directors.

*Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law. An
earlier version of this essay was presented on October 19, 2001, as the 17th Annual Francis
G. Pileggi Distinguished Lecture in Law at the Widener University School of Law. I would
like to thank those who offered their comments and questions on that occasion for their
useful insights. I am also indebted to Bill Allen, Iman Anabtawi, Steve Bainbridge, Stuart

Banner, Caroline Gentile, Bill Klein, Jack Jacobs, Lynn LoPucki, Douglas Olin, Francis
Pileggi, and Leo Strine for their advice and suggestions.
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At the close of 2001, the book value of the assets held by U.S. nonfinancial business corporations totaled nearly $18 trillion.' Book value is
an infamously incomplete and inexact measure of real worth. Nevertheless,
if this figure is at all related to actual value, the economic value of the
assets controlled by Corporate America today can be measured at least in
the tens of trillions of dollars.
Who controls those tens of trillions of dollars? It is a basic tenet of
U.S. corporate law that corporate assets are ultimately controlled by boards
of directors.2 In a typical case, this means a company's assets are managed
by a handful of individuals who may collectively hold very little of the
company's equity and debt, who may have full-time positions and
responsibilities at other firms or institutions, who may be scattered around
the country, and who may only meet to deliberate on the company's future
a half-dozen times a year. These are the people who are in charge of those
tens of trillions of dollars, as a matter of law, and (in most large public
firms, at least) as a matter of fact.
Twenty years ago, this statement might have provoked some readers
to protest: "That's not right. It's not the directors who control the
corporation. It's the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The directors are only
the CEO's puppets: he picked them, and they'll do his bidding." Twenty
years ago, this might have been true. It is not nearly so true today. Today,
if we look at the larger public firms, over 70% have boards with a majority
of "outside" directors.' In recent years these boards have shown a
willingness-some might say enthusiasm-for firing their CEOs. In 2000
alone, 20% of the largest U.S. companies replaced their top executives."

'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts ofthe
United States, Mar. 7, 2002, at 103, Table B.102, Balance Sheet of Nonfarm Nonfinancial
Corporate Business (showing balance sheet assets of $17.5 trillion). Book value may
significantly understate real value as it fails to account for inflation, investments in human
capital, some forms of intellectual property, and so forth.
2
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors .... ").
3
See John C. Coates IV, Measuringthe Domain of the MediatingHierarchy: How
ContestibleAre US Public Corporations?,24 J.CoRP. L. 835,844 (1999) (describing study
that found, in a sample of approximately 1,000 large public firms, that only 30% did not
have a majority of independent directors). Id However, large companies account for the
lion's share of corporate economic activity. For example, the fifty largest companies in the
United States, as measured by revenues, also accounted for 53% of all revenues and 55% of
private-sector employment Id at 848.
4
Anthony Bianco & Louis Lavelle, The CEO Trap, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at 86
(reporting that 39 of the largest 200 U.S. companies replaced their CEOs in 2000, and that
two-thirds of all major companies had replaced their CEOs at least once since 1995).
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In today's business environment, the buck ultimately stops in the
boardroom, not the corner office.
Of course, some contemporary observers might object instead, "[i]t's
still wrong to say directors control the corporation. It's the shareholders
who control the firm, because the shareholders elect the directors." In
recent years there indeed has been a significant increase in shareholder
activism. However, it seems premature to announce that Berle and Means
can now rest easily in their graves, because share ownership and control
have become fused in the modern corporation.5 Despite the rise of
institutional investors like pension funds and mutual funds, share
ownership remains dispersed in most large public companies-it is rare to
find a single shareholder owning even 5% of a big firm. As a result,
shareholders remain rationally apathetic. Rather than become involved in
corporate governance, if they are unhappy they do the "Wall Street walk,"
and sell their shares. This means that, as a practical matter, the average
corporate director does not need to worry too much about being ousted in
a proxy battle. Nor, given the expense and difficulty of a hostile tender
offer in the era of the poison pill and the staggered board, does she need to
worry much about losing her job in a hostile takeover.
For better or worse, boards of directors enjoy enormous control over
tens of trillions of dollars of what is mostly other people's money. Why
have we entrusted directors with those tens of trillions? This question is
one of the most fundamental mysteries of modern corporate governance.
It is a mystery because if we look at the external incentives directors
face-the actual rewards and punishments they receive-the average
director seems to have remarkably little reason to spend much time or effort
laboring on the firm's behalf.
I. ON THE DEFICIENCIES OF DIRECTORS' EXTERNAL REWARDS

It was once the tradition for corporations to pay a flat fee for
directors' services.6 This approach paid a director the same amount whether
the corporation did well or did poorly, and whether the board did a good
job or a bad one. In other words, the traditional compensation structure did
not offer a lot of financial reward for the director who did a good job. In
response to this perceived problem, it has become common practice in
SThe argument that shareholders have little control over publicly-held firms first
gained prominence in 1932, with the publication of Berle and Means' classic argument that
"ownership" had become separated from "control" in the modern firm. See ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, TEE MODERN CoRPoRATioN AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY (1933).
6ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 108-09 (1986).
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recent years for many corporations to pay some or all of their directors' fees
in the form of stock or stock options. This development has been
applauded by some corporate law scholars as a means of "bonding"
directors' financial interests with those of the other shareholders.7
Closer analysis suggests, however, that this bonding is mostly
illusory. For example, the compensation that directors of public corporations typically receive for their services often is not terribly significant, at
least from their perspective. The typical large public corporation will pay
board members an annual fee that can be measured, whether paid in cash
or in stock, in the tens of thousands of dollars. Although that may sound
like a lot of money to the average working person, it is not a lot of money
to the average successful executive, especially the average successful
business executive. The CEO of a typical U.S. firm might be paid millions
or even hundreds of millions of dollars annually in salary, bonus, stock, and
stock options.' In comparison, any fees received for sitting on the board of
another firm, as many CEOs do, seem like pocket change.
Paying directors with shares of stock is also a questionable remedy
because, even when those shares account for a significant portion of the
director's income or wealth, whether the shares go up or down in value is
likely to be only tangentially related to the individual director's own efforts.
The health of the broader economy, changes in consumer tastes, shifting
commodity prices, and increasing or decreasing competition have far more
impact on stock prices. Also, a share price increase is a public good that
invites free riding. Why should an individual director knock herself out to
raise the market price of the company's stock, when all the other members
of the board (not to mention all the other shareholders) are going to share
the benefit?9
Considering financial rewards alone, whether paid in cash or in
shares, directors seem to have little reason to break a sweat in the
boardroom. Rather, we would expect them to shirk to approve what is on
the agenda, take their fees, and go home. But we do not need to rely on
carrots, alone, to motivate directors. There is also the possibility of sticks.

'See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensatio, and Stock
Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 652-53 (1995) ("Corporations should pay their
directors' annual fees in company stock").
SSee Bianco & Lavelle, supra note 4, at 88 (reporting average CEO compensation
in 1999 that exceeded $12 million annually).
9
A third difficulty associated with stock incentive-based compensation is that it can

encourage directors to take actions that can raise share price in the short run effectively,
while harming the firm's long-run prospects. Accounting fraud provides an extreme example
of this phenomenon. See infra text accompanying note 52 (discussing this problem).
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Thus, one might argue that corporate directors have incentive to do a good
job not because they hope for a reward if they do, but because they fear
they will be punished if they do not when a court finds them personally
liable to the firm for breach of fiduciary duty.
I. ON THE DEFICIENCIES
OF DIRECTORS' EXTERNAL PUNISHMENTS

Readers who are experienced corporate judges and lawyers are, of
course, likely laughing. For those who do not see the humor in the
suggestion that directors might be driven by fear of personal liability, a
short primer on the nature and enforcement of directors' fiduciary duties
may be instructive.
In brief, directors' fiduciary duties come in two basic flavors: the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.' These two flavors reflect the fact that
when people misbehave, they tend to do so in one of two common ways.
First, they may misbehave by acting like fools (acting carelessly). Second,
they may misbehave by acting like knaves (acting dishonestly).
The duty of loyalty is designed, in theory, to address the knavishness
problem. Put more bluntly, the duty of loyalty addresses the possibility that
directors might try to steal from their firms. The duty of loyalty discourages such theft by imposing liability on directors who enter unfair
"interested transactions," meaning transactions between the firm and the
director (or between the firm and some individual or entity in which the
director has a personal interest) under terms that are unfavorable to the
firm. It also penalizes directors who steal from their firms by "taking
corporate opportunities"- business opportunities that, for a variety of
reasons, ought to have gone to the firm.
A problem arises, however, when we look to the remedy that is
normally granted when a court finds that a director has violated the duty of
loyalty. When a director has participated in an unfair transaction with the
firm, the usual remedy is to make the director pay a fair price. If the
director has violated the duty of loyalty by taking a corporate opportunity,
"0Most corporate law fiduciary cases revolve around these two forms of duty. In
addition, in extreme situations a director might be found to have violated the duty not to
"commit waste." Under the waste doctrine, directors can be held liable for corporate
transactions when the consideration received by the finn is "so disproportionately small as
to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade." Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing waste standard). More recently,
the Delaware Supreme Court has suggested that directors also have a fiduciary duty to make
accurate disclosures to shareholders, although the nature and consequences of this duty
remain undeveloped. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998).
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she must return to the firm any profits made from that opportunity. In sum,
the remedy for a breach of the duty of loyalty is to make the directorgive
back whatever she has stolenfrom the firm.

This is not the kind of threat to strike terror into a larcenous heart.
As any parent can tell you, if the only punishment a child receives for
stealing from the cookie jar is that she has to give back the cookies if
caught, you can expect a lot of stolen cookies. For similar reasons, it is
easy to suspect that the threat of being held liable for breach of the duty of
loyalty is not the sole, or even the principal, reason most corporate directors
do not steal from their firms. Although the duty of loyalty on first
inspection deters corporate directors from stealing, closer analysis suggests
that as a practical matter the rule does not have much bite.
This toothlessness is even more obvious in the case of the director's
duty of care. In theory, corporate directors owe their firms a duty to
manage those tens of trillions of dollars of corporate assets with the care of
a reasonably prudent person. In practice (as any law student who has taken
a class in corporations knows) the duty of care is ameliorated-some might
say eviscerated- by a doctrine known as the business judgment rule. The
business judgment rule is a legal presumption that a director has, in fact,
met the standards of the duty of care. This presumption can only be
overcome if a plaintiff can show that the director did not act "on an
informed basis," "ingood faith," or "in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."" The last two elements
(good faith and honest belief) usually go unchallenged in any case that does
not involve the sort of conflict of interest that gives rise to a loyalty
question. 12 As a result, whether the business judgment rule applies to a
particular director usually turns solely on whether that director bothered to
"inform" herself before acting. Furthermore, the test for whether a director
is uninformed is not mere negligence, but gross negligence. 3
The businessjudgment rule accordingly allows a director who makes
even a minimal effort to become "informed" to make foolhardy decisions
all day long, without fear of liability. And what about the rare case of the
director who is found to have been uninformed? Even then, other barriers
protect directors from personal liability. For example, Delaware corporation law allows corporations to adopt charter provisions that eliminate

"Smith v.Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
2
See, e.g., id at 873 (noting in duty of care case focusing on whether directors were
informed that "there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing" and as a
consequence "considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us").
3
1d. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
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director liability for breach of the duty of care. 4 A number of large
corporations have taken advantage of this provision. In firms that have not,
if a lawsuit claiming breach of director care is brought, the odds are that it
will be settled, and either an insurance company will foot the bill (under a
director's liability policy) or the corporation itself will pay (under an
indemnity provision). 5
Taking these factors together, it is only a slight exaggeration to
suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be attacked
by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty
of care. This reality of business life is well-recognized among corporate
scholars. 6 In response, several have suggested in recent articles that
corporate directors exercise care not because they fear legal sanctions, but
because they fear what might be called "social sanctions"- because they
do not want to lose face, acquire a bad reputation, or become the object of
disapproving glances and cutting remarks.' 7
This is an intriguing argument. There are several reasons, however,
to suspect that the fear of social sanctions may provide only a weak
incentive for exercising care for most directors in most circumstances.
While directors involved in more-spectacular corporate crimes (for
example, a massive accounting fraud) can suffer unpleasant notoriety,
allegations of garden-variety negligence or conflict of interest are far less
likely to attract media attention. In most cases neither the general public,
nor a director's immediate social circle, would know (much less care)
whether she was doing a good job as a fiduciary. Similarly, it can be
difficult for others to judge whether an allegation of breach of fiduciary
duty has merit, or is simply an attempt to extract money from the director's
liability insurer through the threat of a "strike suit." For these and other

4

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).

I"See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790-91 (2001)
(discussing these and other barriers to director liability).
6
An interesting question is whether it is also well-recognized among corporate
directors. To the extent that it is not, we do not need to rely so heavily on altruism as an
incentive for directors to behave like faithful fiduciaries. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praiseof
Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the
Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REv 675,692 n.61 (2002) (discussing possibility that
directors systematically overestimate the possibility of personal liability).
"7 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 1253 (1999); Edward B. Rock, Saints andSinners: How Does DelawareCorporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811 (2001).
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reasons,18 external sanctions-including not only legal sanctions, but also
social sanctions-are inadequate to explain why a purely self-interested
director would take her fiduciary duties seriously.
Ill. ON TIE POSSIBILITY
OF OTHER-REGARDING DIRECTORS

That brings us back to the fundamental mystery of the corporate
board. Given directors' apparent lack of external incentives to do a good
job-the absence both of good carrots, and of effective sticks-why do we
trust directors to manage tens of trillions of dollars of corporate assets?
And, why do they seem to mostly live up to our trust? Or at least, live up
to it well enough that the U.S. system of corporate governance often is held
up as a model for the rest of the world, 9 and board failures of the sort
recently observed at Enron and Worldcom can still, one hopes, be viewed
as the highly-publicized exceptions rather than the rule.2 °
The discussion below explores this basic mystery. It begins with the
assumption that the institution of the corporate board of directors works.
Put differently, it assumes that the institution of the corporate board of
directors performs some useful economic function. (If it does not, we have
an even greater puzzle to solve-why boards endure as a universal feature
of public corporations.) It then explores the hypothesis that the institution
of the corporate board works because we do not, in fact, rely on external
incentives and pressures, alone, to motivate directors to do a goodjob. We
also rely on internalpressures-includingsuch internal pressures as a
director's sense of honor; her feelings of responsibility; her sense of

"For example, it is difficult to explain why a purely self-interested third-party
observer would bother to impose social sanctions on a careless director. (It is perhaps worth
noting that, even in high-profile cases, white-collar corporate criminals often seem to keep
their friends, families, and country club memberships. See Edward Cohn, The Resurrection
of Michael Milken, in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 13, 2000, at 27 (discussing case of
Michael Milken, who served 22 months in jail and is now a sought-after speaker, author, and
philanthropist)). It is also worth asking why a purely self-interested director would care
about others' opinions, especially if she was retired or close enough to retirement not to
worry about future job prospects. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 1749 & n.27, 179397, and 1801-02 (discussing this and other critiques of the social sanctions argument).
19See John Rossant et al., The CorporateCleanupGoes Global, Bus. WK., May 6,
2002, at 80 ("For decades ... powerful fund managers have lectured the Europeans and the
Japanese20about the need to run their corporations according to the transparent U.S. model.").
See, e.g., John A. Byrne et al., How To Fix Corporate Governance, Bus. WK.,
May 6, 2002, at 69,70 ("In many ways, Enron and its dealings with Arthur Andersen are an
anomaly, a perfect storm where greed, lax oversight, and outright fraud combined to unravel
two of the nation's largest companies.")
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obligation to the firm and its shareholders; and, her desire to "do the right
thing."
Of course, it has become tremendously unfashionable to talk about
these kinds of internal pressures in corporate governance scholarship. This
may be due in part to the defining influence that economic analysis has had
in recent years on the legal culture in general, and on corporate law
scholars in particular.2' Economic analysis has little use for such concepts
as honor, trustworthiness, or duty. This is because economic analysis
generally begins by assuming that people behave like homo
economicus-that they are perfectly rational and purely self-interested
actors.
Yet if this were true of corporate directors-if directors did in fact
always behave like homo economicus-the institution of the board of
directors of the public corporation would never have evolved in the way
that it has. Indeed, it might never have evolved at all. Rational investors
would never cede control of tens of trillions of dollars of assets to purely
self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by the
rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.
Accordingly, if we want to understand how boards of directors work,
we need to develop a better understanding of the sorts of internal pressures
encompassed by terms like "honor," "integrity," "trustworthiness," and
"responsibility." Yet how can we gain a firm grasp on such soft and
slippery concepts? The neoclassical economic literature offers little
guidance. Guidance is available, however, if we expand the search to
include the broader social sciences, including psychology, sociology,
biology, and anthropology.
There is a large body of literature in the broader social sciences on
the phenomenon that will be described below, in general terms, as "otherregarding" behavior.22 As this label suggests, this literature examines
instances in which people behave as if they care about something other than
their own payoffs. This "other" might be the welfare of another person, or
the fate of an institution like "the firm," or even an abstract principle such
as "do the right thing." The point is that the evidence demonstrates that

2

For some examples of this influence, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRuCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
22See, e.g., FRANCES FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY (1995); ELLIOTr SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE
EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998);

(Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
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people sometimes behave altruistically-as if they care about others, and
not only about themselves.
IV. SOME EVIDENCE OF OTHER-REGARDING BEHAVIOR
FROM SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES

As an example, let us consider the lessons that can be drawn from
studies of human behavior in a kind of experimental game called a social
dilemma. Social scientists have shown an enduring fascination with social
dilemma studies-over the past four decades, hundreds of studies have
been conducted.2 3 As a result, and in contrast to other investigations of
other-regarding behavior that are either anecdotal or report the results of
idiosyncratic experiments, the social dilemma literature offers a formal,
comprehensive, and particularly persuasive and useful source of data on
altruistic behavior. This data source offers some important insights into the
nature and incidence of altruistic behavior.
To appreciate these insights, we must first take a closer look at a
typical social dilemma game. In brief, these games are designed to place
players in a position where their self-interest conflicts with the interests of
other players. This is done by presenting subjects with a choice of
strategies: either "cooperate" in a way that benefits the other members of
the group, or "defect" and maximize your own personal payoffs. The
experiment is structured, however, so that if all the subjects behave selfinterestedly and defect, they end up worse off than if all had cooperated.
(As readers who are familiar with rational choice theory may suspect, the
social dilemma game is based on and named after the famous Prisoners'
Dilemma of game theory.)
A common form of social dilemma experiment is called the "Give
Something" game. In this game, a group of subjects (say, four people) are
brought together, and each subject is given a certain amount of money as
an initial stake (say, $10). The subjects are then told that they must chose
between either keeping their $10 for themselves, or contributing some or
all of it to a common pool. They are also told that any money donated into
the common pool will be multiplied by some factor (for example, tripled)

'See generally Robyn M. Dawes, SocialDilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 169, 18288 (1980) (reviewing results of numerous studies); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for
the Benefit of Us- Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 22,
at 97 (reviewing studies); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation,2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 187 (1988) (summarizing studies); David Sally, Conversationand Cooperationin
Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis ofExperiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY &
SoC'Y 58 (1995) (summarizing over 100 studies done between 1958 and 1992).
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and then redistributed back to the subjects. However, the money in the
pool will be distributed back in equal shares to each of the subjects in the
game, whether or not they chose to donate in the first place.
How would homo economicus play the Give Something game?
Homo economicus would say to herself: "No matter what the others do, I
should keep my ten bucks. If I donate it, it will be tripled to $30, but I will
get only one-fourth of that back, which is $7.50. So I will keep my $10,
and hope to share as well in one-fourth of any amount that ends up in the
pool if my fellow players are foolish enough to donate."
Of course, if everyone thinks this, everyone keeps her $10. No
money goes into the pool and no money gets multiplied. Conversely, if
everyone behaves altruistically and donates her money, the pool of $40 will
become a pool of $120, and each of the four subjects will get $30 back-a
considerably better payoff. Unfortunately, if the players are rational and
selfish, this will never happen. This is because, while cooperation produces
a better outcome for the group, defection always produces the best result
for the individual player. No matter what her fellow players do, the
individual player always maximizes her payoff by defecting, instead of
cooperating.
Homo economicus accordingly would never choose to donate to the
common pool in a one-shot social dilemma. What do real people do?
There have been literally hundreds of experiments reported in the
literature.2 4 With remarkable consistency, these studies conclude that real
people cooperate. In fact, they cooperate a lot. On average, participants in
social dilemmas contribute about 50% of their initial stake to the common
pool.2"
What does this tell us about human behavior? The first thing it tells
us is that people frequently behave as if they care about others' payoffs, and
not just their own. Researchers have gone to rather extraordinary lengths
to ensure that the subjects in a social dilemma understand that they will
receive no extrinsic reward or recognition for cooperating. For example,

24

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.

-See, e.g., Dawes &Thaler, supra note 23, at 189 (observing that subjects contribute
an average of 40-60% in social dilemma contribution games); Sally, supra note 23, at 62
(reporting mean cooperation rate of 50% for sample of over 100 studies).

Because most reported social dilemma experiments use undergraduate and graduate
students as subjects, such results can be critiqued on the grounds their behavior may not be
typical of other populations. However, a recent cross-cultural study of social di lemma games
among nonstudents in a variety of cultures found similar patterns of behavior. See Joseph
Henrich et a, In Search ofHomo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale
Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 73, 74 (2001) (reporting cooperation rates ranging from 26%

to 58% in seven very different societies.)
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in many experiments, the subjects are strangers who are told that they will
play the game only once and who are assured that their choice of strategy
will remain a secret, unknown to either the experimenter or their fellow
players.26 This protocol eliminates any fear of social disapproval or
retaliation. Experimenters have also "debriefed" subjects after the game is
played to determine whether they truly understood the payoff function in
the game, and found that the players did in fact recognize that cooperation
reduced their own payoffs.27 In other words, the players recognized that
cooperation was an altruistic act.
Social dilemma experiments accordingly demonstrate, rather
conclusively, that people often behave altruistically. This is not to say that
they necessarily feel altruistic. One can imagine any number of
psychological mechanisms that might lead someone to conclude that she is
better off, subjectively, if she sacrifices to help others. For example,
altruistic behavior might be motivated by a desire to avoid unpleasant
feelings of guilt, by a desire to conform to some internalized notion of
proper role or deportment, or by the fear of divine retribution. The point
is that, whatever these subjective motivations a, they are subjective.
Objectively speaking, when one makes a sacrifice to make others better off,
one makes oneself worse off. Indeed, this is the very definition of sacrifice.
Social dilemma studies accordingly do not prove psychological
altruism (that people truly care about others' welfare). They do, however,
offer compelling evidence of behavioralaltruism (people often act as if
they care about others). A variety of theories can be advanced to explain
why people sacrifice for others, and I suspect each may be correct for some
persons, and some circumstances. Luckily, we do not need to understand
what motivates altruistic behavior to observe the behavior itself. Even
better, we do not need to understand what motivates altruistic behavior to
encourage it.
This is because a second important lesson of the social dilemma
literature is that altruistic behavior is not only common, it is easy to
manipulate. Experimenters have found that they have a remarkable degree
of control over whether or not people cooperate in such games. By
manipulating certain variables, social scientists have been able to produce
cooperation rates as low as 5%(an almost complete absence of altruism).28
Conversely, they have also been able to produce cooperation rates as high

26

Sally, supra note 23, at 65, 67.
"See, e.g., Henrich et al., supra note 25, at 74.
2
Sally, supra note 23, at 62, 65.
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as 97% (nearly universal altruism).29 It is important to bear in mind that in
all of these games, the external payoffs favored defection.
Such findings command attention. If we can understand the factors
and variables that tend to promote other-regarding behavior among
experimental subjects in the laboratory, perhaps we can also begin to
understand the factors and variables that are likely to promote otherregarding behavior in the boardroom. In other words, perhaps we can
harness the phenomenon of other-regarding behavior, and encourage
directors of public corporations to behave even more altruistically than they
already do in looking after the firm's interests.
To explore this possibility, the discussion below examines three
variables that have been found to be very powerful, statistically speaking,
in predicting cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. It also speculates
as to what these findings might tell us about how we can best encourage
corporate directors to serve as careful, loyal fiduciaries.
V. SOCIAL CONTEXT As A DETERMINANT
OF ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

Let us begin by considering the variable that, perhaps more than any
other, seems to influence individuals' decisions about whether or not to
cooperate in a social dilemma.3" This critical variable is something that
might be called "social context." Social context can be defined as an
amalgam of signals we receive about such matters as what other people
expect, what other people need, and what other people are likely to do.
Experimenters have found that such social variables seem to have a
significant impact on a subject's decision whether or not to cooperate in a
social dilemma game. For example, researchers have found that
cooperation rates are influenced by subjects' perceptions of how much their
cooperation benefits others (the greater the perceived benefit to others, the
greater the incidence of cooperation); 3 by whether the subjects feel a sense
of common social identity with each other (players divided into random
groups cooperate more with members of their "in-group" than with

29

3

1d

See id. at 77 (concluding from statistical analysis of over 100 reported studies that
a variety of social variables that should be irrelevant to purely-self interested subjects are
significantly correlated with cooperation rates, while, except for considerations of personal
cost, "[aill the other variables that should affect a selfish decider either are not meaningful
or have the opposite sign (of statistical significance]").
3
Id. at 79.
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members of their "out-group");32 and by whether the subjects expect their
fellow players to cooperate or defect (players who believe their fellows are
going to cooperate, are far more likely to cooperate themselves).33
It is important to note that homo economicus would be utterly
indifferent to such matters if they did not change his own payoffs. Homo
sapiens,however, seems to find social variables compelling. Judging from
our behavior, we are extremely sensitive to the signals we receive about the
expectations, needs, attitudes, identities, and likely behavior of the people
around us.
As an example of this sensitivity, consider a particular variable that
seems to be especially powerful in predicting cooperation rates, and,
moreover, that may be especially relevant to understanding the behavior of
corporate directors. This variable is the experimenter's requests. In some
social dilemma games, researchers have not only presented the subjects
with a choice of cooperating or defecting, but they also have requested that
the subjects adopt one strategy or the other. Readers will probably not be
shocked to learn that when the experimenter in a social dilemma game asks
subjects to cooperate subjects are more likely to cooperate. Similarly,
when the experimenter suggests the subjects defect, subjects are more
34
likely to defect.
This result is surprising only when one stops to recall that a purely
self-interested subject would pay no attention to the experimenter's requests
in a social dilemma game, because these requests do not change the payoff
structure of the game. Players always maximize their personal payoffs by
defecting, and the rational and self-interested actor should recognize this
and defect. Nevertheless, real people playing social dilemma games appear
to pay very close attention to the experimenter's desires, so much so that
they will change their behavior significantly in response to mere hints about
what the experimenter wants.
A good example of this sensitivity can be found in the results of a
social dilemma experiment in which the experimenters told their subjects
that they were going to play something called the "Community Game." On
average, subjects in this experiment cooperated 70% of the time. Then, the
experimenters changed the name of the game to the "Wall Street Game."

32

Sally, supra note 23, at 78-79.
See Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 23, at 187.
'Sally, supra note 23, at 64-65, 74.
33
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Subjects asked to play the Wall Street Game only cooperated 33% of the
time.35
These results imply that you do not always need to threaten directors
with sticks or bribe them with carrots to get them to behave like careful
and loyal fiduciaries. To the contrary, directors might be inclined to
behave in an other-regarding fashion simply because a respected authority
asks them to do so. This observation supports the views of corporate
theorists who argue that judicial opinions in fiduciary duty cases can
encourage directors to behave like reliable fiduciaries not primarily by
threatening them with the prospect of personal liability, but by expressing
and reinforcing social norms of careful and loyal fiduciary behavior.36 As
Professor and former Delaware Chancellor William Allen has put it,
judicial opinions influence the behavior of directors as "moral beings" by
"express[ing] community ideals" about their proper deportment and role. 3
If directors viewjudges as respected authorities similar to the experimenter
in a social dilemma game, this "expressive" technique may be effective.
Judges can speak loudly, and leave the big stick at home.3"
This human sensitivity to social signals about appropriate behavior
also suggests that perhaps we should be more troubled by a recent
development that has often been assumed to promote better director
performance. This development is the trend toward paying directors' fees
not in cash but in the form of shares of the company's stock.39 On one
hand, this compensation scheme gives directors an economic interest in the
price of the company's shares, and so a personal motive to increase share
price. This selfish motive is likely to be weak, however, given the

"Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implicationsfor
Social Conflict and Misunderstanding,in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed
et al. eds., 1996).
36
See sources cited supra note 17; William T. Allen, The Corporate Director's
FiduciaryDuty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under US. CorporateLaw, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING

RESEARCH 307, 328 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
37
3

1d at 329.

1t should be noted that many commentators who argue that corporate law works

primarily by influencing norms presume these norms are enforced primarily through social
sanctions imposed by third parties. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 17, at 1013-14 (saying that
"[tlhe story I tell in this Article is very much a story of how a small community imposes
formal and informal, legal and nonlegal, sanctions on its members"); Skeel, supra note 17
(discussing third-party shaming). The social dilemma evidence suggests, however, that third
party sanctions are reinforced and perhaps not even necessary if the norm is expressed by
a respected authority, and then becomes "internalized." See Blair & Stout, supra note 15,
at 1749 & n.27, 1796 (discussing internalization versus third party enforcement).
"See supra text accompanying note 7.
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disconnect between any individual director's efforts and overall stock
performance. °
And by emphasizing self-interest, share-based
compensation schemes may inevitably send a signal that we expect
directors to behave in a selfish fashion in the boardroom. This signal could
become a self-fulfilling prophesy. By treating directors as entirely selfinterested, we increase the odds that they will actually behave this way.
The net result might be an overall decline in the quality of directors'
performance, if their altruistic motivations are undermined more than their
selfish motivations are reinforced.
If this possibility seems far-fetched, consider the results of a recent
field study undertaken at six day-care centers. In this study, the
experimenters set out to determine what would happen if the day-care
centers announced that parents who arrived late to pick up their children
were, for the first time, subject to a fine.4 The homo economicus model
would predict that imposing a fine would decrease the incidence of late
arrivals, because it increases the cost of tardiness. Yet the experimenters
observed the opposite result. After the fine was announced, parents began
arriving later more frequently than before"2 One possible explanation is
that the fine signaled that it was socially acceptable and possibly expected
that parents would arrive late. This encouraged parents to adopt a more
self-interested calculus that did not include the cost, in terms of
inconvenience, their tardiness imposed on the childcare providers at the
center. 3 The net result was a lower perceived "cost of lateness," despite
the new fine."
VI. PERSONAL COST AS A DETERMINANT
OF ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

Such empirical results obviously are inconsistent with the homo
economicus model of purely self-interested behavior. However, those who
are fans of rational choice analysis need not despair. There is a second

4

See supra text accompanying note 8.
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).
1d. at 3.
43
1d at 13-15.
"There is a rapidly-expanding literature on this phenomenon, which is called
"crowding out." See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A
Survey of EmpiricalEvidence, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 245, January 2000,
downloadable at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfTn?abstractid=203330. The phrase
"crowding out" finds its origins in the notion that if you pay or penalize someone for doing
something, they will focus on their own rewards and punishments in a fashion that "crowds
out" other-regarding motivations.
4
Uri
42
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variable that has proven significant in predicting cooperation rates in social
dilemma games that is far more "economic" in flavor. This second variable
is the personal cost of altruistic behavior to the actor.
It is a common finding in the social dilemma literature that, as the
cost of cooperation to the individual player rises, the incidence of
cooperative behavior tends to fall.45 In other words, people are more
inclined to behave "nicely" when it does not cost them too much. In
considering the significance of this finding, it is important to bear in mind
that any degree of altruistic cooperation in a social dilemma is contrary to
the homo economicus model. Thus social dilemma studies demonstrate that
people are far more altruistic than neoclassical economic theory assumes.
Yet even as subjects in social dilemmas demonstrate a willingness to
sacrifice to benefit others, self-interest seems to play an ongoing role in
explaining their behavior.
What does this result tell us about the behavior of corporate
directors? Most important, it tells us that if we want directors to do a good
job of looking out for the interests of the firm and its shareholders, it is
essential to make sure that "doing a good job" is not too personally costly
to the directors. For example, corporate law is sensible in providing
directors with a right to be indemnified for expenses they incur serving the
interests of the firm, such as the expenses associated with attending
meetings or hiring consultants or outside counsel for expertise and advice.
If directors had to pay for these expenses out of their own pockets, social
dilemma studies suggest that they might balk at making such a large
sacrifice, even if the social context supports altruistic behavior. Similarly,
the social dilemma evidence provides support for the idea that we can
improve corporate governance in firms where the CEO also serves as chair
of the board, by appointing an independent "lead director" who has
authority to call meetings and draft agendas. The appointment of a lead
director may lower the psychic, political, and administrative costs
independents would otherwise incur in questioning the CEO's wisdom,
encouraging more independent oversight.4 6
A less obvious but equally important point is that we want to keep
a close eye on the opportunity costs associated with being a director, and
make sure those costs do not become too large. Serving as a director takes
time, and time is a valuable resource. The director who sits on the boards
of more than one company, or the director who is also CEO of another firm,

4

Sally, supra note 23, at 75.
"6See generally Stout, supra note 16, at 688-89 (discussing the importance of
lowering directors' personal "cost of confrontation" if we want to encourage effective and
independent oversight).

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 28

may find time such a valuable and scarce resource that she becomes
reluctant to sacrifice much of it to serving the shareholders' interests. Thus,
we might expect individuals who have fewer pressing obligations-- retirees
(or even law professors)- to be more willing to altruistically devote time
and attention to overseeing their firms' affairs. This is not to deny that
executives and "promiscuous" directors can bring to the boardroom skills,
information, and contacts that might be quite valuable. Such contributions
carry a price, however, in the form of a risk that the busy director will
spend less time, and pay less attention, than a director with fewer demands.
For related reasons, we should be careful about asking directorsespecially outside directors-to take too great a role in managing the firm.
Put differently, if we want directors to do a good job, we do not want to ask
them to take on too many tasks. This observation is consistent with the way
corporate governance is actually practiced in most large firms. Directors
generally do not run the business on a day-to-day basis (this job is
delegated to executives and employees), but instead serve an oversight or
monitoring role. In effect, directors select senior managers and then step
aside, intervening only in times of crisis, or on very large issues such as a
merger or major refinancing.
This pattern of relative uninvolvement is sometimes offered as proof
of director malfeasance, evidence that directors are not working as hard as
they should. Such critiques misunderstand the director's role. Because
directors' rewards and punishments are only very loosely tied to their
performance, we must inevitably rely on directors' internalized sense of
responsibility as their primary if not their sole motive for exercising
judgment and care. The empirical evidence suggests that if we place too
heavy a burden on such altruistic motivations, they will crumble under the
weight.
It thus makes sense for large corporations to rely on professional
managers for most decisions, and to limit directors' responsibilities
primarily to monitoring. Monitoring is not nearly as demanding or as timeconsuming as managing. Nevertheless, it can be every bit as important.
Just as a smoke detector may seem an idle lump of plastic and metal until
an actual fire, a board of directors that appears passive most of the time can
save shareholders billions of dollars, if it notices and reacts when things go
wrong. For example, the directors of Ford Motor Company may have
saved the firm's shareholders from much greater losses when, in the wake
of falling sales and rising controversy over the safety of the once-popular

47

See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.

2003]

ON THE PROPER MOTIVES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Ford Explorer, they ousted former CEO Jacques Nasser.4 Conversely,
Enron-which suffered from what has been described as "an almost total
collapse in board oversight"--disintegrated from unchecked managerial
excess.

49

A related and very important lesson that can be drawn from the
social dilemma evidence on the inverse relationship between cooperation
and personal cost is that it is essential that we do not rely too heavily on
director altruism in situations where a director has a substantial personal
interest adverse to the firm. Put differently, when conflicts of interest loom
large, director altruism is likely to founder on the rock of self-interest. This
suggests, for example, that the traditional distinction between "inside"
directors who are employees of the firm, and "outside" or "independent"
directors who are not, is sensible. This is not because inside directors are
incapable of altruism. Rather, it is because inside directors, as employees,

may often have a personal stake in how the board runs the firm, and as a
result be subject to pressures of self-interest that outside directors do not
50
face.
For similar reasons, if we want to rely on outside directors to curb
the predictably self-interested behavior of inside directors whose prospects
for substantial personal loss or gain may undermine their altruistic
motivations, outside directors must be truly independent. They should not,
for example, be allowed to use their corporate positions to extract from the
firm consulting fees, jobs for relatives, or subsidized access to a private jet.
A related observation is that corporate law should be extremely suspicious
of any "interested" transaction between the firm and its directors. This
suspicion should only be tempered-perhaps not by much-in cases where
the interested transaction receives the clear approval of the disinterested
members of the board.5 '
Finally, recognizing the threat that self-interest poses to director
altruism suggests yet another difficulty associated with the modem practice
of compensating directors with shares of company stock. If directors are
permitted to sell such shares, a conflict of interest is created between the
directors and the firm's long-term shareholders, by giving the directors a
personal interest in raising today's stock price at the risk of long-term value.
The result may be a board that is tempted to "look the other way" as
"8See Joseph B. White & Norihiko Shirouzo, Backfire: A Stalled Revolution by
Nasser Puts a Fordin the Driver's Seat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at Al.
49
Byme et al., supra note 20, at 72.
5
For example, inside directors obviously have a personal interest that conflicts with
the firm's when the board is determining executive compensation.
5
'See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 28

corporate managers push the envelope in accounting, or even in the
extreme, engage in fraudulent accounting practices. Indeed, it has been
suggested that stock-based compensation is partly to blame for recent board
failures such as the one observed at Enron." Thus, stock-based compensation is again revealed to be a double-edged sword. It gives directors
selfish incentives, but in the process undermines their altruistic
motivations.
VII. CHARACTER AS A DETERMINANT
OF ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

The discussion so far has focused on understanding what
circumstances are likely to encourage the average person to behave in an
altruistic fashion. No analysis of the role of other-regarding behavior in
promoting good corporate governance would be complete, however,
without mentioning a third factor that has proven important in determining
cooperation rates in experimental games. This third factor is something a
psychologist might call "personality type." Laypersons might call it
"character."
Let us return to the general finding that cooperation rates among U. S.
subjects playing social dilemma games average 50%. This average
cooperation rate, it turns out, reflects a blend of two strategies people tend
to adopt in social dilemma games: either they donate all the money they
have been given to the common pool, or they donate none of it." In other
words, subjects in social dilemma games tend to divide into two groups, the
"cooperators" who give everything and the "defectors" who give nothing.
Social scientists have investigated whether these patterns of behavior
somehow reflect basic personality characteristics. They have concluded
that the answer, to some extent, is yes. Although cooperation rates in social
dilemmas are highly dependent on social context and considerations of
personal cost, people also seem to bring to the experiments a predisposition
to either cooperate or defect.54

52
Byrne et al., supra note 20, at 71-72 (discussing Enron and arguing that "[t]he
tyranny of the daily stock price has led to borderline accounting and in some cases, outright
fraud").
53
See Henrich et al., supra note 25, at 75.
'See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 1764-66 (discussing evidence in support of
this conclusion); see, e.g., James E. Alcock & Diana Mansell, Predispositionand Behavior
in a Collective Dilemma,21 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 443 (1977) (noting that people predisposed
to cooperate are less influenced by the actions of others); Peter Brann & Margaret Foddy,
Trust andthe Consumption of a DeterioratingCommon Resource, 31 J.CONFLICT RESOL.
615, 622-23 (1987) (finding that subjects who score high on a scale intended to measure
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The source of such differences in predisposition is an interesting
question. Although genetic causes cannot be ruled out, there is
considerable evidence to support the claim that a predisposition to behave
in an other-regarding fashion is something that is largely acquired through
experience." In other words, a sense of responsibility or obligation toward
others is learned. Student subjects in social dilemmas, for example, tend
to display higher cooperation rates as they complete more years of
education. 6 Additional indirect support for the learning hypothesis can be
found in a recently-published study that examined the results of social
dilemma games played in seven small herding, hunting, and agricultural
societies located around the globe." This study reported significant differences among cultures: the average cooperation rate for the Machiguenga of
Peru, for example, was only 22%, while the researchers observed a
cooperation rate of 58% (higher than for U.S. subjects) among the Orma of
Kenya. 8 More to the point, researchers also found a strong correlation
between cooperation rates and the frequency of cooperation and market
exchange in the culture studied. This finding suggests that habits of
cooperation may be learned: the more frequently members of a particular
society cooperate with others in their daily economic lives, the more likely
they are to cooperate with strangers in a social dilemma experiment as
well. 9
What can these findings teach us about boards of directors in the
United States? The answer is fairly straightforward. If we want directors
of public corporations to act like faithful fiduciaries-if we want them to
serve the interests of the firm and its shareholders, even in situations where
it is hard to reward them sufficiently when they do or punish them
adequately when they do not--one of the most'critical things we can do is
to exercise care in selecting those who serve as directors.
As noted earlier, social dilemma experiments suggest that almost
anyone can be induced to cooperate altruistically, if the social context is

their willingness to trust others also are more likely to cooperate in a social dilemma).
"See Blair & Stout, supranote 15, at 1766-68 (discussing learning); Lynn A. Stout,
On the Export of US.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A
Transplant Take? (Apr. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)
(discussing causes of cooperative behavior).
DoesStudying EconomicsInhibit Cooperation?,7 J.ECON.
S6Robert H. Frank, et al.,
PERsps. 159, 166 (1993) (stating that "the overall defection rate declines significantly as

students progress through school").
"Henrich et al., supra note 25.
1d.at 75-76.
SSee id. at 75-77.
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structured to strongly support altruism, and ifpayoffs are arranged so that
altruistic behavior is not too personally costly. 6° Yet the evidence also
suggests that some people, whether by nature or nurture, are more inclined
toward other-regarding behavior than others. These "cooperators" behave
altruistically even in situations where the social signals they receive are
somewhat mixed, and altruism requires more than a nominal personal
sacrifice. In everyday business life, directors often face such situations.
Thus, if we want corporate directors to serve an other-regarding role, we
should select as directors those individuals who are more inclined toward
other-regarding behavior in the first place.
This is not to say that a sense of honor or responsibility is the only
quality one should look for in a director. A willingness to serve the
interests of others does not, alone, guarantee that a particular individual
will do a good job in the boardroom. Knowledge, experience, and business
sophistication are also essential. Also, in some cases, an individual can
bring to the board business or political contacts that may prove of great
value to the firm. In such situations, it may make sense to consider a tradeoff between altruistic sensibilities, and other desirable director attributes.
Nor does the idea that directors ought to behave in an otherregarding fashion address the difficult issue of who, exactly, is the "other"
whom directors ought to serve. One of the most fundamental questions in
corporate law is what courts mean when they say that directors, as
fiduciaries, ought to serve the interests of "the corporation and its
shareholders."6' 1 Does this mean that the shareholders are the firm-that
they are the only group whose interests directors should care about? Or
does the notion of "the firm" encompass something larger, so that directors
should sometimes consider the interests of managers, employees, creditors,
or even the broader community? The debate between the "shareholder
primacy" view and "stakeholder" models of the corporation dates back at
least seventy years,62 and it remains unresolved today.63 Yet the debate

6°See supratext accompanying notes 28-29 (describing how some experiments have
produced cooperation rates as high as 97%).
61
See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1989) (holding that "[ilt is basic to our law that the board of directors ...owe fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders").
'See, e.g., Adolph A. Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 45 HARv.L.
REV. 1049 (1932) (arguing that directors should serve shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, For
Whom are CorporateManagersTrustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (arguing
that directors should also serve employees, managers, and the broader society).
63
See William T. Allen, OurSchizophrenic Conceptionofthe Business Corporation,
14 C~ARDOZO L. REv. 261, 265-66 (1992) (discussing debate); see also William T. Allen et
al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridgingthe Conceptual Divide, 69 U.

2003]

ON THE PROPER MOTIVES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS

does not need to be resolved to appreciate the importance of an otherregarding temperament to a fiduciary role. Whatever interests are
encompassed in the idea of "the firm," it remains the firm-and not
themselves-whom directors are supposed to serve.
So long as this is true, an inclination toward other-regarding
behavior-whether described as a sense of honor, a feeling of responsibility, or the desire to "do the right thing"- will remain a desirable quality
in a corporate director. To borrow a metaphor from a very experienced
director, to do a good job on a board an individual needs an "internal
gyroscope"-something that will keep her steady on her course, despite
outside pressures to stray. If we want to have effective boards, it is
essential to find the individuals who have that internal gyroscope to serve
as directors.
How can we find these directors? There are a number of
possibilities, but one of the most obvious is to look at a person's history as
evidence of her character. Has she lived up to her commitments, even in
situations where she did not have to? Has she undertaken activities that
demonstrate that she can care about something other than her own payoffs?
Has she given evidence, in the past, of a desire and an ability to do the right
thing, even when doing the right thing was not personally advantageous, or
particularly popular? If the answers to these questions are "yes," then it is
this type of person-and not homo economicus-whom you want to invite
to join your board.
VIII. CONCLUSION

One of the most important questions in corporate governance is the
question of how corporate directors can be best motivated to serve the

interests of the firm. Directors of publicly-held companies frequently hold
only small stakes in the companies they manage. Moreover, a variety of
legal rules and contractual arrangements insulate them from liability for
business failures. Why then should we expect them to do a good job?

Ci. L. REV. 1067 (2002) (discussing persistence of debate); D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CoRP.L. 277 (1998) (discussing shareholder primacy
view); see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
CorporateGovernance,97 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that directors ought
to maximize shareholder wealth); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (arguing that directors can and
sometimes ought to take the interests ofnonshareholder groups into account); Lynn A. Stout,
Bad and Not-So-BadArgumentsfor Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002)
(discussing debate and concluding that arguments for shareholder primacy are relatively

weak).
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Conventional corporate scholarship has had great difficulty wrestling
with this question, in large part because conventional scholarship adopts
the economist's assumption that directors are rational actors motivated
purely by self-interest. This homo economicus model of behavior may be
fundamentally misleading when applied to corporate directors. The institution of the corporate board is premised on both the expectation and the
actual experience of director altruism, in the form of a sense of obligation
to the firm and its shareholders.
To understand the proper role and conduct of corporate directors, we
must accordingly abandon the homo economicus approach in favor of a
model of human behavior that takes account of the empirical phenomenon
of altruistic behavior. One potential starting point for such a project can be
found in the extensive evidence that has been developed over the past four
decades on altruism among strangers in experimental games. This evidence
demonstrates that altruistic behavior is in fact quite common. More
important, altruistic behavior also is predictable. A variety of factors can
reliably increase, or decrease, the incidence of altruistic cooperation
observed in experimental games.
We remain at an early stage in our understanding of the determinants
of human altruism. One should accordingly be careful in offering concrete
proposals for changing corporate law or policy based solely on the results
of experimental studies. After all, one of the foremost lessons of such
studies is that other-regarding behavior often depends on social context.
Social context, in turn, is a complex phenomenon. Until the experiment is
tried, one cannot really know whether parents will be more tardy, or less
tardy, when the day-care center decides to impose a fine for lateness.
Similarly, any proposal for reforming the corporate board perhaps should
be "field tested" before it is imposed more broadly.
Nevertheless, there has been enough progress in our understanding
of altruistic behavior that there are at least some lessons that should be
taken into consideration in thinking about corporate governance. Most
important, if we want the social institution of the board of directors to be
effective, we should do our best to accomplish three things. First, we
should try to ensure that directors receive social signals that will encourage
them to adopt an other-regarding, rather than a purely self-interested,
perspective-that will convince them that they ought to "do the right
thing." Second, we should make sure that doing the right thing is not too
personally costly for directors. Third, we should make sure that we pick
the sort of people who want to do the right thing in the first place.
Of course, these are lessons that most experienced business people,
including most experienced business lawyers, have already learned. Most
of us are sophisticated, if not always conscious, observers of human nature.
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The point here is simply that we should pay attention to what we already
know. Personal payoffs count. But so do social context and the quality we
call "character."

